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1 Introduction
The federal funds rate target is the principal monetary policy instrument of the Federal
Reserve (Fed) and governs the short-term market interest rates in the US. This paper
examines the manner in which the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) changes
this target in its regularly scheduled meetings. In practise, the FOMC either leaves the
target intact or changes it 25 or 50 basis points in absolute value. In the paper, I focus
on modeling and predicting the direction of the change, that is, whether the choice is
no change, decreaseor increase. To take the discrete nature of the choices and their
potential serial dependence into account, I employ an extension to the multinomial logit
model where the probabilities of the discrete choices depend on exogenous variables as well
as on lagged choices and their conditional probabilities. This model allows considering
a rich variety of dynamic dependencies in a transparent fashion and does not involve
technical problems present in various previously applied econometric approaches.
In the rst step, I consider target change forecasts conditional on information available
a week in advance to an FOMC meeting. As in Piazzesi (2005), with this short forecast
horizon, the analysis can be regarded as high-frequency identicationof the FOMCs
target setting behavior. Among a large number of candidate variables, I nd that the
spread between the six-month Treasury bill rate and the federal funds rate is the most
dominant predictor of the direction of the target. When this variable is employed as the
only predictor, also the previous target change decision has signicant predictive content
for the next weeks target change choice. However, out of numerous specications, a
simple static model that employs the spread, the unemployment rate and the real GDP
growth rate as regressors fares the best for predicting the direction of the target a week
ahead, while no additional predictive power is obtained by conditioning on lagged target
change decisions.
In the second step, I investigate to what degree the direction of the target can be
predicted at longer forecast horizons. For this purpose, I derive new procedures for making
multiperiod ahead forecasts that are based on the dynamic variants of the multinomial
logit model. I assess the predictive performance of various variables and dynamic model
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specications through a simulated out-of-sample analysis. I nd that the current values
of the same three variables - the spread, the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth
rate - can produce accurate forecasts for the direction of the target up to several (at least
seven) months ahead. Again, no signicant additional predictive power is obtained by
conditioning on lagged target changes.
The empirical results have various implications. First, in contrast to the impression
given, e.g., by Rudebusch (1995, 2002), the probabilities of target increases and decreases
can be successfully modeled as functions of variables relevant to the goals of the Fed.
Second, the nding that the lagged target change fails to have predictive content in the
best performing models indicates that the apparent positive serial dependence in target
changes derives from the Feds response to serially correlated shocks in the macroeconomy
as suggested, e.g., by Piazzesi (2005). Third, the fact that the spread variable is the most
signicant predictor gives support to the recent research emphasizing the Feds desire
to react on shocks in the term structure of interest rates (e.g., Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2002), Gallmeyer et al. (2005) and McCallum (2005)), while the predictive content of
the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth rate suggests that the Fed is particularly
concerned with stabilizing the real economy. Fourth, the lack of the predictive content
of ination and expected ination indicates that ination is not the principal driving
factor of the direction of the Fed policy, or alternatively, that the Fed regards the spread
as the main indicator for (expected) ination. Finally, changes in the target are well
predictable several months ahead, which contrasts with various previous empirical papers
that indicate the target is predictable at most two months ahead (e.g., Goodfriend (1991)
and Rudebusch (1995)).
The econometric modeling approach of the paper deviates from recent studies that
handle the discreteness of the target by applying ordered probit or logit models (e.g.,
Dueker (1999), Dueker and Rasche (2004) and Hu and Phillips (2004)).1 I motivate my
approach by the following points. First, the parameters of the multinomial logit model
1To allow for serial dependence in target changes, Dueker (1999) species the underlying latent variable
as an autoregressive process. For an earlier work along similar lines, see Eichengreen, Watson and
Grossman (1985).
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are easier to interpret than those of the order response models.2 This is particularly ad-
vantageous when dynamic settings are considered. Second, the multinomial logit model
is exible in the sense that it can accommodate asymmetric e¤ects on the part of the
regressors. For example, the results of the paper indicate that a change in the unem-
ployment rate has stronger impact on the probability of a target increase than on that of
decrease. This asymmetric e¤ect cannot be captured by an ordered response model, in
which the cumulative probabilities of the ordered choices are determined by a single linear
function of the regressors. Third, the multinomial logit model is computationally more
tractable than the ordered response models. This advantage is particularly pronounced
when multiperiod ahead forecasts are formed.
My analysis also distinguishes from recent papers that seek to tackle with irregularities
in the timing of the target changes. For example, Hamilton and Jordá (2002) apply an
autoregressive conditional duration model to predict whether a nonzero target change
occurs in any given week. For the latest period (1989-2001) of their sample, they nd
that the Fed is extremely unlikely to change the target during a week without an FOMC
meeting. Also Piazzesi (2005) points out that target changes outside FOMC meetings
have become extremely rare and are hardly predictable at all. In her continuous time
model, she assigns a small and constant probability to a target change outside FOMC
meetings. All these considerations suggest that nothing crucial is lost by focusing on the
modeling of the target changes that take place at the dates of the FOMC meetings, as
is done in this paper. This approach has the additional bonus that the analysis can be
conducted in a simple and transparent fashion without technical di¢ culties.
2Greene (2000, p. 878) points this out by saying: Indeed, without a fair amount of extra calculation,
it is quite unclear how the coe¢ cients in the ordered probit model should be interpreted.
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2 Methodology
2.1 Model
Consider a time series variable yt that may take on one of n discrete values or states,
indexed by j = 1; 2; :::; n; and an m-vector xt of other variables. In my application, yt
denotes whether the FOMC decides to keep the target rate intact, decrease or increase it.
We are interested in dynamic modeling of yt using xt as a vector of explanatory variables.
Let Ft =  f(ys; xs) ; s  tg be the information set available at time t. Assume that,
conditional on Ft 1, yt has a distribution function with probabilities pjt = Pr(yt = j);
where
Xn
j=1
pjt = 1. It is useful to dene the indicator functions vjt such that vjt = 1, if
yt = j, and vjt = 0, if yt 6= j; j = 1; :::; n.
Modeling of yt boils down to modeling of the conditional probabilities pjt. I do this
through the log odds ratios
log

pjt
pnt

= jt; j = 1; 2; :::; n  1; (1)
where
jt =
pX
k=1
n 1X
i=1
kjii;t k +
qX
k=1
n 1X
i=1
kjivi;t k + 
0
jxt 1; j = 1; :::; n  1: (2)
The equations (1) and (2) yield the original conditional probabilities
pjt =
exp(jt)
1 +
Xn 1
i=1
exp(it)
; j = 1; :::; n  1 (3)
pnt =
1
1 +
Xn 1
i=1
exp(it)
: (4)
Notice that the n   1 equations in (2) are su¢ cient for describing the conditional prob-
ability function of the variable yt with n di¤erent states, and it does not matter which
state is chosen as the reference state, because one can always convert one formulation into
another.
The model dened in (1) and (2) is a dynamic extension of the multinomial logit model.
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By setting kji = 
k
ji = 0 in (2) we arrive at the usual staticmultinomial logit model.
The presence of the lagged log odds ratios, i;t k; and the lagged indicators vi;t k in (2)
allow for a variety of dynamic dependencies in the underlying conditional probabilities
pjt. To illustrate this, dene t = (1t; :::; n 1;t)0 and vt = (v1t; :::; vn 1;t)0 and write (2)
in vector form as
t =
pX
k=1
Akt k +
qX
k=1
Bkvt k + C 0xt 1; (5)
where Ak = [kji], Bk = [
k
ji] and C = [1 2    n 1] are parameter matrices with
obvious content. Equation (5) can be analyzed in the same fashion as vector autore-
gressive models. It is natural to assume that the coe¢ cient matrices Ak in (5) sat-
isfy the usual stationarity condition, that is, the solutions of the determinantal equation
jI   A1z   A2z2   :::  Apzpj = 0 must lie outside the unit circle. I point out that this
condition does not necessarily guarantee that the process yt is stationary or ergodic. De-
riving such conditions is out of the scope of this paper.
For further illustration let p = 1 and notice that, by repetitive substitution, (5) can
be rewritten as
t = A
l
1t l +
lX
j=1
Aj 11
"
qX
k=1
Bkvt k j+1 + C 0xt j
#
; (6)
where Aj1 is a matrix power such that A
0
1 = I; A
1
1 = A1; A
2
1 = A1A1; ::: Under the
stationarity condition we obtain the limiting result
t =
1X
j=1
Aj 11
"
qX
k=1
Bkvt k j+1 + C 0xt j
#
: (7)
This equation shows that, in general, the conditional probabilities pjt depend on the entire
history of past values of yt and xt. If there are no autoregressive terms (i.e., if Ak = 0 for
all k), the conditional probabilities pjt depend on xt 1 and at most the qth lag of yt.
The above model can be seen as a multinomial extension of the dynamic binary re-
sponse model of Kauppi and Saikkonen (2007), with the marginal di¤erence that I here
apply a logistic function rather than a cumulative normal. As a part of a discrete-state
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continuous-time model, Russell and Engle (2005) apply a slightly more general model in-
cluding the term  kjipi;t k on the right hand side of (2). They argue that the so obtained
regressors vi;t   pi;t form a martingale di¤erence sequence and thus characterize the new
information associated with the period t state. E¤ectively, the dynamics of the under-
lying log odds ratios are a¤ected by previous conditional probabilities linearly (through
the pj;t k terms) and nonlinearly (through the j;t k terms). A specication that is even
more general allows di¤erent coe¢ cients for vj;t k and pj;t k. In this paper, I keep with
the specication in (2), because it proves to be su¢ cient for my empirical application and
because its coe¢ cients are easily interpreted.
2.2 Inference
Suppose we have observed the variables yt and xt for t = 1; :::; T and that q initial
values are also available. Dene the parameter vector  = [0; 0; 0]0 where ;  and  are
column vectors stacking the parameters kji; 
k
ji and j; respectively. Then the conditional
log likelihood function can be written as
l() =
TX
t=1
lt() =
TX
t=1
nX
j=1
vjt log(pjt());
where the pjt() are obtained by inserting 1t(); :::; n 1;t() into (3) and (4). When
p > 0, we must choose the initial values j; p+1; :::; j;0. I do this by using formulae that
can be interpret as estimates of the unconditional mean of t in (5). For example, if
p = q = 1, I set 0 = (I   A1) 1(B1v + C 0x), where a bar is used to signify the sample
mean of the indicated variables.
The likelihood function can be maximized by standard numerical methods. Denote
the resulting maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of  by b. Under appropriate regularity
conditions, b is consistent and has the asymptotic distribution
T
1
2
b    d! N  0; I () 1 (8)
where I () = plimT!1 T 1
PT
t=1 (@lt () =@) (@lt () =@
0). For the purpose of forecasting
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we may end up applying a misspecied model. For example, suppose that at time t we seek
to forecast the value of yt+h (h  1) : This calls for forecasts of the explanatory variables.
However, one may be unwilling to build a forecasting model for the explanatory variables
but, as an alternative, one modies the specication (2) by replacing xt 1 by xt h. A
similar approach may be applied to lagged values of vit. Thus, if the data generation
process is given by (2) such modied models are misspecied when h > 1.
Motivated by the preceding discussion I also consider the standard extension of (8)
given by
p
T (^   ) d! N
 
0;J () 1 I ()J () 1

; (9)
where J () =   plimT!1 T 1
PT
t=1 @
2lt () =@@
0 and  is a value in the parameter
space of  assumed to maximize the probability limit of T 1l () (for details, see Section
9.3 of Davidson (2000)). In the case of a correctly specied model we have I () = J ()
and consistent estimators of this matrix are given by both T 1
PT
t=1(@lt(^)=@)(@lt(^)=@
0)
and bJ (^) = T 1 TX
t=1
@2lt(^)=@@
0:
In the case of a misspecied model the estimator bJ (^) still estimates the matrix J ()
consistently but in that case the estimation of the matrix I () is more complicated. For
simplicity, denote @lt(^)=@ = d^t: Then a general estimator is given by
bI(^) = T 1 TX
t=1
d^td^
0
t +
T 1X
j=1
wTj
TX
t=j+1

d^td^
0
t j + d^t j d^
0
t
!
;
where wTj = k (j=mT ) for an appropriate function k (x) referred to as a kernel function.
The quantity mT is the so-called bandwidth which for consistency is assumed to tend to
innity with T but at a slower rate. In my empirical application, I use the Parzen kernel
function (see Davidson (2000, p. 227)) and, following the suggestion of Newey and West
(1987), I select mT according to the rule mT = floor(4(T=100)2=9), where the function
floor(x) rounds x to the nearest integer less than or equal to x (cf. Eviews, p. 457).
Using the estimators bJ (^) and bI(^) in conjunction with the asymptotic results (8)
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and (9) one can construct standard Wald tests for hypotheses on the parameter vector :
In particular, approximate standard errors for the components of the ML estimator ^ can
be obtained in the usual way from the diagonal elements of the matrix bJ (^) 1bI(^) bJ (^) 1
or, if a correct specication is assumed, from the diagonal elements of the matrix bJ (^) 1.
2.3 Forecasting procedures
This section shows how the above models can be applied for making probability forecasts
for an h periods ahead observation of a discrete variable of interest given information
available at the time of forecasting. It is useful to think the problem as that of making
forecasts for the indicators vjt; j = 1; 2; :::; n. Let Et h() and Pt h() signify conditional
expectation and conditional probability given Ft h and notice that, in the mean square
sense, an optimal h periods ahead forecast of vjt based on information at time t   h is
Et h(vjt) = Pt h(yt = j). By this relation and the law of iterated conditional expectations,
we have
Et h(vjt) = Et h(Pt 1(yt = j)) = Et h(pjt): (10)
Thus, equations (3) and (4) give readily the optimal one-step ahead prediction for any
form of (2).
The situation is more complicated when we want to make a multiperiod ahead forecast
with h  2. To illustrate this, assume p = 1 and notice that by (6) we have
t = A
h
1t h +
hX
j=1
Aj 11
"
qX
k=1
Bkvt k j+1 + C 0xt j
#
=
8<:Ah1t h +
min(h;q)X
j=1
Ah j1
qX
k=j
Bkvt h+j k + Ah 11 C
0xt h
9=;
+
h 1X
j=1
Ah 1 j1
0@min(j;q)X
k=1
Bkvt h+j+1 k + C 0xt h+j
1A ; (11)
where the term in the curly brackets amounts to a function of known observations (i.e.,
data up to period t   h), while the remaining part is a function of the observations on
yt h+1; :::; yt 1 and xt h+1; :::; xt 1 that are not available at the time of forecasting. To
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avoid computing conditional expectation given these unknown observations in (10), one
may modify the original model by replacing xt 1 with xt h and vi;t k with vi;t h k so that
the applied lags of the right hand side variables in (2) are at least as long as the forecast
horizon. In this case, the formula in (11) would only involve variables that are known at
the time of forecasting and thus the h-period ahead forecast is obtained straightforwardly
as above. However, this lag tailoringapproach forces one to apply misspecied models,
which may lead to poor forecasts especially, when the forecast horizon is long and the
true lags of yt and xt are short. Therefore, I consider procedures where the applied
lags of yt and xt need not relate to the forecast horizon. The unknown predictor values
xt h+1; :::; xt 1 are exogenous to the model and thus they may be replaced by suitable
forecasts. I consider some alternative procedures in my empirical application below.
For the treatment of the unknown values yt h+1; :::; yt 1 it does not matter whether the
unknown regressor values xt h+1; :::; xt 1 are replaced by their longer (horizon-tailored)
lags or whether they are replaced by their forecasts. Given this, it su¢ ces to compute the
probabilities of all possible pathsor realizations of yt h+1; yt h+2; :::; yt 1 that lead to a
given value of yt. Dene the vector notation
ytt k = (yt k; yt k+1; :::; yt) for k = 0; 1; 2; :::
and the Cartesian product Sk = f1; 2; :::; ngk for k = 1; 2; ::: In other words, Sk contains
all possible k-vectors where each element takes on a value from the set f1; 2; :::; ng. Then
notice that
Pt h(yt) =
X
yt 1t h+12Sh 1
Pt h(yt h+1)
h 1Y
j=1
Pt h(yt h+1+jjyt h+jt h+1); for h  2; (12)
where Pt h(yt h+1+jjyt h+jt h+1) is the probability of a given value of yt h+1+j conditional on
Ft h and the event yt h+jt h+1. Each of the conditional probabilities on the right hand side
of (12) can be computed straightforwardly using the underlying specication of (2). For
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example, suppose the log odds ratios are modeled as
jt =
n 1X
i=1
jivi;t 1 + 
0
jxt h; j = 1; :::; n  1; (13)
where the lag length of the predictor is tailored to match with the forecast horizon. Now,
if h = 2, we have
Pt 2(yt) =
X
yt 12S1
Pt 2(yt 1)Pt 2(ytjyt 1);
where
Pt 2(yt 1 = j) =
8<:
exp(
Pn 1
i=1 jivi;t 2+
0
jxt 3)
1+
Pn 1
i=1 exp(
Pn 1
k=1 ikvk;t 2+
0
ixt 3)
; j = 1; :::; n  1
1
1+
Pn 1
i=1 exp(
Pn 1
k=1 ikvk;t 2+
0
ixt 3)
; j = n
and
Pt 2(yt = jjyt 1) =
8<:
exp(
Pn 1
i=1 jivi;t 1+
0
jxt 2)
1+
Pn 1
i=1 exp(
Pn 1
k=1 ikvk;t 1+
0
ixt 2)
; j = 1; :::; n  1
1
1+
Pn 1
i=1 exp(
Pn 1
k=1 ikvk;t 1+
0
ixt 2)
; j = n:
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The analysis uses data about all of the regularly scheduled FOMCmeetings and associated
target rate decisions that occurred from December 1989 through January 2007 (see Table
1).3 These decisions cover the majority of the target changes during the sample period.
However, sudden inuential shocks have sometimes caused the FOMC to hold unscheduled
meetings either in person or over the phone, and occasionally these meetings have resulted
in target changes between regular meetings. The recent literature makes clear that these
unscheduledtarget changes have become extremely rare and are impossible to predict
in practise (Hamilton and Jórda (2002) and Piazzesi (2005)). Piazzesi (2005) notes that
for some of these surprise moves, we know what triggered them, such as the 9/11 terrorist
3The starting time of the sample concurs roughly with the time when the Fed shifted to the current
practise where it explicitly sets a target for the funds rate (see Hamilton and Jórda (2002)). Also, since
that time, all target changes have been multiples of 25 basis points and have been implemented soon after
the FOMC meeting. Since January 2004, all changes have been implemented right after the meeting.
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attack, while for other moves it is even di¢ cult to pinpoint the special event that triggered
them. Given these points we do not expect to loose much by restricting attention to target
changes made at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings.
Table 2 illustrates apparent patterns between successive target rate decisions in the
sample. According to the table, positive (negative) target changes tend to follow positive
(negative) target changes, while the opposite has never occurred, that is, a negative target
change has not followed a positive target change, or vice versa. In view of this observation,
one expects that positive (negative) target changes help in predicting positive (negative)
target changes. Other than this, it seems that a small (25 basis point) target hike is
likely to follow another small target hike, while large (50 basis point) target hike is never
followed by further change.
In this paper, I focus on predicting the direction of the target change, which captures
the essential part of the Feds policy choice, and leave it for later work to analyze whether,
for example, a target hike is 25 or 50 basis points in size.4 Thus, I consider a target change
variable that indicates whether the FOMC decides to increase, decrease or make no change
to the target. Accordingly, dene yt = 1; if there is a target rate cut, yt = 2; if there is a
target rate hike, and yt = 3; if the target rate remains the same in period t. yt = 3is
the reference state.
The primary question is to what degree target changes can be predicted by variables
that are important for the long run goals of the Fed and how much additional predictive
content is obtained from past target changes when such variables are taken into account. A
list of candidate variables is given in Table 3 (cf. Hamilton and Jórda (2002) and Piazzesi
(2005)). There are two measures for ination, one based on the realized consumer price
ination, the other based on consumersexpectations about future ination. The overall
activity of the economy is measured by the real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, the
capacity utilization rate, and a measure of the output gap. Also, I examine the predictive
4It would be natural to model the size of the target change by applying a hierarchical or nested model
with two steps. In the rst step, one would model the direction of the change by using a model like the
one in this paper, and in the second step, one would predict whether a non-zero change is small or large
by applying a binary response model. This two-step procedure is likely to be consistent with the way the
target change decisions are made in practise.
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content of various interest rates and their spreads. The applied long rates vary from
the six-month to the 10-year Treasury bond yields, while the applied short rates are the
e¤ective federal funds rate and the three month Treasury bill rate.
For all of the candidate predictors, I construct weekly observations using the same
convention as Hamilton and Jordà (2002). Accordingly, the basic observation weeks match
with the reserve maintenance period so that a week starts always on a Thursday and ends
on a Wednesday. The value of a variable that is associated with any given week is the
value of the variable on the nal Wednesday of that seven-day period. This information
is readily available for the nancial and monetary variables that are updated on a daily or
weekly basis. For the rest of the variables that are measured on a monthly or a quarterly
basis I apply the latest available value known on the nal day of the observation week.
These values can be found on the basis of the actual release dates of the data in each case.
For example, the CPI value of a particular month is usually announced in the third week
of the subsequent month. Thus, during the rst and second week of September the CPI
ination rate is based on the CPI value of June, while during the third and fourth week it
is based on the CPI value of August. Variables based on the real GDP are updated four
times a year based on the release dates of the nal gures.
3.2 Predicting target changes a week in advance
This section searches for the best performing model for predicting target changes a week in
advance to an FOMC meeting. To do this, I rank di¤erent model specications primarily
by using the Schwarz (1978) Bayes information criterion (BIC) (See Inoue and Kilian
(2006) for motivation). For a complementary purpose, I also compare models in terms of
the pseudo R2 measure of t developed by Estrella (1998).5 This measure is convenient
in that it takes on values between 0 and 1 and can be interpreted in the same fashion as
5Denote by Lu the unconstrained maximum value of the likelihood function L and by Lc the corre-
sponding maximum value under the constraint that all coe¢ cients are zero except for the constant.
The latter model is thought of as a benchmark and the pseudo R2 measure is dened as pseudo
R2 = 1   (log(Lu)= log(Lc)) 2 log(Lc)=T , where T denotes the sample size (Estrella 1998). While Es-
trella (1998) introduces this measure in the context of a binary response regression, his paper shows that
the measure can be applied for a multinomial response case like the one in this paper.
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the coe¢ cient of determination in a linear regression. Finally, I also examine the (robust)
standard errors (and corresponding t-ratios) of the estimated parameters. In general, all
these measures lead to the same conclusion about the ranking of the investigated models.
In what follows, I regard t as the index of the periods (specic weeks) of the scheduled
FOMC meetings. That is, t points to the t:th FOMC meeting of the sample. In order
to refer to weeks between meetings, I specify a companion index w such that xt k;w l
indicates the value of the predictors x l weeks in advance to the t  k:th FOMC meeting
in the sample.
In an initial analysis, I searched for the best dynamic specications by estimating the
model (2) with various choices of the lags of the indicators of the states, vj;t k; and the
lagged autoregressive terms j;t k. One cannot estimate the impact of a negative (positive)
target change on the odds of a subsequent positive (negative) target change relative to
no target change, because negative (positive) target changes have never followed positive
(negative) target changes in the data (see Table 2). Thus, restrictions on the coe¢ cients
of the indicators vj;t k in (2) must be imposed. On the basis of the empirical evidence
and common sense arguments, one might want to assume that the FOMC simply does
not make a positive (negative) target rate change, if its most recent decision was to make
a negative (positive) target rate change. To satisfy this assumption we would set 112 and
121 equal to very large negative values. Alternatively, because we cannot really estimate
the values of 112 and 
1
21, we can ignore them altogether and set them equal to zero. I did
all of my analyses using both approaches, but found no big di¤erences in their predictive
performance. To this end, I assume the restriction 112 = 
1
21 = 0.
The main observation from the comparisons of di¤erent dynamic specications is that
the rst lags of vjt and jt are generally superior to their longer lags independent of what
predictive variables are included in the model. Also, the autoregressive terms jt k are
statistically signicant only in their own equations (if at all). In line with this nding, I
assume the restriction 112 = 
1
21 = 0. Given these points, the best performing models are
nested in the following two equations for the log odds ratios
jt = jjj;t 1 + jjvj;t 1 + jx
0
t;w 1; j = 1; 2; (14)
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where xt;w 1 is a vector consisting of a constant term and selected predictive variables
observed a week in advance to the tth FOMC meeting. Notice that the subscript t   1
in j;t 1 and vj;t 1 refers to the time of the preceding FOMC meeting, which occurred
about six to seven weeks earlier. I emphasize that the most recent values of the predictors
(xt;w 1) have better in-sample performance than any longer lags (xt s;w l with s > 0 and
/ or w > 1). The subsequent section analyzes the predictive performance of longer lags
in more detail.
I next illustrate the performance of the candidate predictors described in Table 3.
Among all of the applied variables, the spread between the six-month Treasury bill rate
and the federal funds rate, henceforth just the spread, turns out to make the largest
contribution to the overall predictive performance of the model. This conclusion is sup-
ported by all of the applied measures of in-sample performance and holds across di¤erent
dynamic specications no matter what other predictors are included in the model. Vari-
ous alternative spread variables also have good predictive performance, but due to their
mutual correlation the overall predictive performance cannot be improved by using more
than one such variable in the model. Table 4 reports estimation results for four speci-
cations of (14) using the spread as the only predictive variable (in xt;w 1). Column (1)
reports estimation results for the static model (obtained from (14) under the restriction
jj = jj = 0). The spread has a large t-ratio in both of the equations of the model and
according to the pseudo R2 measure of t the model does a fairly good job in predicting
the realized target changes over the past fteen years.
The other three model estimates in Table 4 (columns (2)-(4)) show that the spread
continues to be statistically signicant and has marked predictive content even if dynamic
features are included in the model. According to BIC and the pseudo R2 the dynamic
specication in column (2) should be preferred to the other models of Table 4. Indeed,
the parameter estimates for the lagged target change indicators (vj;t 1) are rather large
and statistically signicant in both equations. The estimates indicate that the log odds of
the FOMCs decision to decrease (increase) the target rate relative to leaving the target
intact is higher in the case where the previous meeting already decreased (increased) the
target than in the case it did not. The estimated e¤ect is slightly stronger for the log odds
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of a target rate hike than for the one of a target rate cut. The superiority of the model
in column (2) and the fact that the estimates for the autoregressive terms in models (3)
and (4) are mostly not signicant indicate that the most recent decision of the FOMC is
what counts, not the entire history of the spread variable.
The performance of the model can be further improved by using other predictive
variables. Table 5 reports estimation results for the best three models ranked by BIC.
Notice that all of the models of Table 5 outperform those of Table 4. The best model
(column 1) picks up three predictors: the spread, the unemployment rate and the real
GDP growth rate and selects no other predictors. The second best model (column 2)
drops the real GDP growth rate, while the third best model (column 3) replaces the real
GDP growth rate with the capacity utilization rate. Nevertheless, the model of the rst
column is regarded as the best model for predicting target changes a week in advance to
an FOMC meeting.
The coe¢ cient estimates for the unemployment rate (in column 1 of Table 5) indicate
that an increase (a decrease) in the unemployment rate increases (decreases) the log odds
of a target rate cut (hike) relative to no target rate change. This is what we would
expect theoretically. Interestingly, the estimates suggest that the unemployment rate has
a strong impact on the log odds of a target hike, while the corresponding estimated e¤ect
on a target rate cut is not signicant. Similarly, the parameter estimate for the real
GDP growth rate is signicant in the log odds equation for target rate drop, but not so
in the equation for target rate hike. These observations suggest that the probability of
a target rate hike (drop) is particularly sensitive to changes in the unemployment rate
(the GDP rate). If the unemployment rate increases, the likelihood of a target rate hike
decreases, while not only the probability of a target rate drop, but also the probability
of no target rate change increases simultaneously. That is, a higher unemployment rate
makes it likely that the target is dropped or kept the same, while a lower unemployment
rate makes it likely that the target is just raised. In a similar fashion, a higher GDP
rate makes it likely that the target is raised or kept the same, while a lower GDP rate
makes it likely that the target is decreased. It is worth noting that these estimates are
clearly against conventional ordered logit (or probit) models. For example, the fact that
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the unemployment rate has very distinct coe¢ cients in the two log odds equations is
inconsistent with the proportional oddsproperty of the ordered logit model.
The target rate decisions of the Fed are based on information right before the FOMC
meeting. Given this fact, Piazzesi (2005) argues that target forecasts with su¢ ciently
short informational lag may identify a high-frequency policy rulethat describes how the
Fed changes the target in response to information contained in the applied regressors. In
her empirical analysis, she nds that bond yields (especially with maturities around two
years) have signicant predictive content for target changes a week ahead. She also nds
that the target level inuences the Feds target change decisions; if the target is higher
(lower) than its mean, there is a high conditional probability of a target cut (hike) at the
next meeting. This nding indicates mean reversionin the target. Table 6 illustrates
how the present analysis relates to these results. Column 1 of the table reports estimation
results for a model that uses the target rate as a regressor together with lagged target
change indicators. The parameter estimates for the target rate are consistent with mean
reversion; a higher (lower) target rate increases the probability of a target cut (hike).
As in Piazzesi (2005), the estimated mean reversion is low. Nevertheless, the e¤ect is
estimated imprecisely and the relevant t-values are well below two.
The situation changes when the model is augmented with the two-year Treasury bond
rate that corresponds with the two year swap rate applied by Piazzesi (2005) (see column
2). Now, all parameter estimates are large and statistically signicant. Reading of the
estimated coe¢ cients indicates clearly that it is the spread between the two-year rate and
the target rate that counts, not one or the other alone. The estimation results in column 3
conrm that the two-year rate alone is not signicant. Thus the present analysis indicates
that the Fed policy is more sensitive to shocks in the term structure than to particular
yields. This behavior is consistent with the recent literature favoring so called McCallum
policy rule (see Gallmeyer et al. (2005) and McCallum (2005)).
There is continuing debate about whether the Fed adjusts the target only gradually to
its desired level. It is commonly thought that such monetary policy inertiais the reason
why one target change is often followed by a series of additional target changes in the
same direction. Thus, we would expect that a target hike (drop) in the previous meeting
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increases the likelihood of a target hike (drop) in the next meeting, other things equal.
Above, we found this to be the case if the model includes the spread as the only regressor.
However, lagged target changes do not appear signicant in the favored model that uses
the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth rate as additional regressors (column 1
of Table 4). Thus, the apparent positive serial dependence of the target changes must arise
from the Feds systematic response to persistent shocks in the macroeconomy (cf. Piazzesi
(2005)). Obviously, the unemployment rate exhibits signicant positive autocorrelation
which may be one of the key sources for persistent target changes.
3.3 Forecasting performance at various horizons
When the forecast horizon is longer than six weeks, there may be one (or more) meeting(s)
between the current week and the week for which the forecast is made.6 In this situation,
we are dealing with multiperiod ahead forecasts, where the underlying periods correspond
to the dates (or weeks) of the prescheduled FOMC meetings. In what follows, I consider
such h-period ahead forecasts under the assumption that the forecast is made four weeks
in advance to the next immediate FOMC meeting. Thus, if h = 1, the forecast is made for
the next FOMC meeting a month ahead, while if h = 2, the forecast is for the subsequent
FOMC meeting that is on average 10-11 weeks (almost a quarter) ahead, and so on.
The formula (12) in section 2.3 shows how h-period ahead forecasts are computed for
a given model specication in (2). Here I apply specications that are like the one in (14)
except that the (optimal) lag of the predictors, xt;w 1, is replaced by either a horizon-
tailoredlag xt h+1;w 4 or a one-periodlag xt;w 4. Obviously, if h = 1, the two cases are
the same and the one-period ahead forecast is obtained straightforwardly. When h > 1,
the forecast is still obtained from (12), but is a function of known observations only, if a
horizon-tailoredmodel is assumed. Otherwise, if a one-period aheadmodel is applied,
the forecast formula in (12) entails using forecasts of some future values of the predictors.
The two approaches have their potential advantages and disadvantages. The horizon-
tailoredmodel has the disadvantage that it forces one to use misspecied models, but
6In fact, sometimes there are only four weeks between two prescheduled FOMC meetings in sequence
so that intermediate meetings may occur even at ve or six weeks forecast horizons.
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has the advantage of avoiding forecast errors on the part of the applied regressor values.
By contrast, the one-period aheadmodel has the advantage that the optimal lag is
always applied, but has the disadvantage due to potential errors in the applied forecasts
of the regressors.7 I try to assess these trade-o¤s in more detail below.
I compare di¤erent forecasting procedures in a simulated out-of-sample exercise. The
basic idea is to make a series of pseudo out-of-sample forecasts using separate sub-
samples of the full sample and then check how the forecasts match with the realized
target changes. Using each of the sub-samples at the time, I estimate a given model
specication and make a forecast for the desired FOMC meeting h periods ahead given
data up to the last observation in the sub-sample. Independent of the forecast horizon, I
make forecasts for all of the meetings that occurred January 2002 through January 2007
(in total 41 forecasts). Thus, if h = 1, the rst sub-sample covers observations on target
decisions and predictors from December 1989 up to four weeks in advance to the FOMC
meeting in January 2002, while, if h = 2, the rst sub-sample covers data up to four weeks
in advance to the last FOMC meeting in 2001 and so on.
I use the maximum value of the likelihood function as the main criteria for evaluating
out-of-sample forecasts and, to facilitate interpretation, I rescale it into a pseudo R2 in the
same way as in the case of the in-sample results in the previous sections (cf. Kauppi and
Saikkonen (2007) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998)).8 In addition, I compute the average
of the predicted probabilities of the realized target changes. This latter measure gives
an idea about how sharply the probability forecasts track the realized outcomes. Finally,
I also compute actual forecasts for yt as byt = argmax(bpjt) and consider the percentage
7We can regard the four-weeklag xt;w 4 as the optimallag, because it yields essentially the same
in-sample and out-of-sample performance as the one-weeklag xt;w 1 that was found to be the rst-best
choice in the previous section. The fact that similar results are obtained with one- and four-week lags is
not surprising given that only the spread changes weekly, while the unemployment rate and the real GDP
growth rate tend to remain the same within a month, because these variables are updated only monthly
and quarterly, respectively.
8The pseudo R2 for out-of-sample results is a useful, simple measure of out-of-sample t and is
comparable to the root-mean-squared error or R2 measures in the linear regression case. However, when
applied to out-of-sample results, there is no guarantee that the value of the pseudo R2 will lie between
0 and 1, as is also true in the standard linear regression. A negative pseudo R2 simply indicates that
the explanatory variables do such a poor job that they are worse than a constant term alone. (For more
details, see Estrella and Mishkin (1998, p. 47).)
18
share of the correct forecasts byt = yt.
I report results for specications that employ one of four compositions of the predictors:
the spread alone or together with the unemployment rate or the real GDP growth rate or
both. Overall, these four predictor combinations had the best performance in extensive
initial comparisons over various predictor sets and dynamic congurations. My initial
in-sample and out-of-sample analyses also indicate that either the simple static model or
the dynamic model with lagged target decision indicators should be applied rather than
the ones involving autoregressive terms. Thus, I only report results on the two types of
dynamic specications.
Table 7 reports measures of out-of-sample accuracy on models that apply horizon-
tailored lags of the regressors. The horizon ranges from one meeting (h = 1) to eight
meetings (h = 8) ahead. The results indicate that the current values of the spread,
the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth rate have clear predictive content for
target changes two to three meetings ahead. Forecasts that use the spread together with
either the unemployment rate or the real GDP growth rate or both are clearly more
accurate than forecasts that apply the spread as the sole predictor. When h = 1, the
dynamic specications (columns (5)-(8)) always yield more accurate predictions than the
static models (columns (1)-(4)). The di¤erence in accuracy (between dynamic and static
models) is the largest when the applied set of predictors includes just the spread (compare
column (1) with column (5)) or the spread and the real GDP growth rate (compare column
(3) with column (7)). For longer forecast horizons, the dynamic model clearly outperforms
the static model only in the case where the spread is the sole predictor. The gures of
panel (c) of Table 7 indicate that most of the models can predict the direction of the
target with impressive accuracy (90% success rate) a month ahead. Also, two and three
meetings ahead predictions can be very accurate (80% success rate) especially, if the
unemployment rate is applied as a predictor. As the horizon exceeds three meetings, the
forecasting accuracy starts to decrease. One reason may be that with longer horizons the
applied regressor values tend to deviate more from the ones the Fed will observe when
it makes the decision we seek to predict, and thus, the horizon-tailored model does not
approximate the true decision rule as well as a model that condition on the observations
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actually used in the decision making. The next question is whether we can improve the
accuracy of longer forecasts by applying a one-period aheadmodel where the applied
lags of the regressors match with the rightones.
In general, obtaining an h-period ahead forecast based on a one-period aheadmodel
entails that we apply forecasts of unknown regressor values in the formula (12). As a
rst cut on this, I simply replace the unknown regressor values by the end-of-sample
values of the regressors. The corresponding results are given in Table 8. These forecasts
are superior to those based on models with horizon-tailored lags of the regressors at all
horizons h > 1. The models in columns (2) and (6) of Table 8, which apply the spread
and the unemployment rate as regressors, attain essentially the same, impressive accuracy
(90% success rate) at horizons between one to three meetings ahead. The accuracy of
these same models as well as those of the models in columns (4) and (8) (employing all
three regressors) is still very good (about 75% success rate) at the horizon of four meetings
(about seven months) ahead. As an interesting observation note that the accuracy of the
simplest models, which use the spread as the sole predictor (columns (1) and (5)), remains
practically the same across horizons 1 to 6. Overall, the results of Table 8 indicate that
it is much more benecial to apply a one-period aheadmodel even with the simplest
possible treatment of the unknown regressor values than apply models using horizon-
tailored (longer) lags of the predictors.
The remaining question is whether forecasts based on a one-period aheadmodel
can be improved by using more advanced forecasts of the unknown future values of the
regressors. Here I apply forecasts based on univariate autoregressive (AR) models. That
is, given a sub-sample, I estimate an AR model for each of the applied regressors using
the available monthly (or quarterly) observations and then apply the estimated AR model
to compute forecasts over su¢ ciently many months (or quarters) ahead. Using these AR
forecasts I then obtain corresponding weekly observations to be used in the eventual
target forecast based on the formula in (12). I apply the rst order AR model for the
unemployment rate and the second order AR model for the spread and the real GDP
growth rate. These lag order choices are supported by BIC.
It turns out that the use of an AR forecast for the spread results in less precise forecasts
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than those in Table 8. Thus, I keep with the current values of the spread and only replace
the unknown values of the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth rate in (12) with
their AR forecasts. The results are shown in Table 9. Interestingly, there is yet no clear
improvement in forecasting accuracy compared with the results shown in Table 8. Thus,
it seems that the current values of the regressors provide su¢ ciently competitive forecasts
for future target changes. I leave it for later research to study whether other techniques
for predicting the regressors might improve the accuracy of the target forecasts at long
horizons.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops forecasting procedures based on a dynamic extension of the multino-
mial logit model and applies these for examining the predictive content of several macro-
economic and nancial variables for the Feds target rate decisions. Various model speci-
cations with numerous predictor combinations are compared in terms of in-sample and
out-of-sample performance. The analysis shows that the current values of the six-months
Treasury bill spread relative to the federal funds rate, the unemployment rate and the real
GDP growth rate have particularly pronounced predictive power for target rate decisions
to be made in an FOMC meeting scheduled a week to seven months ahead. Surprisingly,
models that condition on past target change decisions do not improve the forecast and
are not signicant when the three dominant predictors are employed. This indicates that
the positive serial dependence in target changes is due to the Feds systematic response
to persistent shocks in the state of the economy.
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Table 1. Target change decisions by the FOMC
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
2/7 0 2/6 [2]  50 2/5 0 2/3 0
3/27 0 3/26 0 3/31 [1]  25 3/23 0
4/15 0 4/14 0 4/19 0 4/18 0
7/3 [1]  25 7/3 0 7/1  50 7/7 0
8/21 0 8/20 [1]  25 8/18 [1]  25 8/17 0
10/2 [1]  25 10/1 0 10/6 0 9/23 0
11/13 [2]  50 11/5  50 11/17 0 11/16 0
12/19  25 12/18 [2]  50 12/7 [1]  50 12/22 0 12/21 0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
2/4 25 2/1 50 1/31  25 2/5 0 2/4 0
3/22 25 3/28 0 3/26 0 3/25 25 3/31 0
4/17 50 4/23 0 4/21 0 4/20 0 4/19 0
7/6 0 7/6  25 7/3 0 7/2 0 7/1 0
8/16 50 8/22 0 8/20 0 8/19 0 8/18 0
9/27 0 9/26 0 9/24 0 9/30 0 9/29  25
11/15 75 11/15 0 11/13 0 11/12 0 11/17  25
12/20 0 12/19  25 12/17 0 12/16 0 12/22 0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2/3 0 2/2 25 1/31  50 1/30 0 1/29 0
3/30 0 3/21 50 3/20  50 3/19 0 3/18 0
4/18 0 4/16 50 4/15  50 4/7 0 4/6 0
6/30 25 6/28 0 6/27  25 6/26 0 6/25  25
8/24 25 8/22 0 8/21  25 8/13 0 8/12 0
10/5 0 10/3 0 10/2  50 9/24 0 9/16 0
11/16 25 11/15 0 11/6  50 11/6  50 10/28 0
12/21 0 12/19 0 12/11  25 12/10 0 12/9 0
Table cont. next page
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Table 1 (cont.)
2004 2005 2006 2007
1/28 0 2/2 25 1/31 25 1/31 0
3/16 0 3/22 25 3/28 25
4/4 0 4/3 25 4/10 25
6/30 25 6/30 25 6/29 25
8/10 25 8/9 25 8/8 0
9/21 25 9/20 25 9/20 0
11/10 25 11/1 25 10/25 0
12/14 25 12/13 25 12/12 0
Notes: The table reports all target change decisions (in basis points) made by the FOMC
at its regularly scheduled meetings from December 1989 until January 2007. The ac-
tual target changes were implemented right after the meeting or a day after, except
the cases denoted by superscripts: [1] The actual change was implemented 1-3 weeks
after the meeting, while the associated FOMC meeting transcripts indicate the actual
decision was made at the meeting. [2] The actual  50bp change was implemented
in two steps,  25bp at the meeting date and the remaining  25bp 1-3 weeks after
the meeting, while the FOMC meeting transcripts indicate that both changes were de-
cided at the meeting. Source: http://minneapolisfed.org/info/policy/dates-hist.cfm and
http://federalreserve.gov/fomc/.
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Table 2. Target rate decisions in subsequent FOMC meetings
Current FOMC Meeting
 50bp  25bp 0bp +25bp +50bp All
 50bp 6 3 3 0 0 12
Preceding  25bp 2 3 10 0 0 15
FOMC 0bp 4 8 59 6 3 80
Meeting +25bp 0 0 4 19 2 25
+50bp 0 0 5 0 0 5
All 12 14 81 25 5 137
Notes: The entries of the table are obtained using data on 138 subsequent FOMCmeetings
that took place during the period from December 1989 until January 2007.
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Table 3. Candidate predictive variables
Variable Describtion
Ination measures:
Change of ination rate Ination rate is annual log change of
monthly CPI, less food and energy.
Change of expected ination rate Expected ination rate is annual log
change of monthly ination expectation in-
dex provided by Consumer Survey, Univer-
sity of Michigan
Economic activity measures:
Real GDP growth Annualized quarterly log change of real
GDP
Unemployment rate
Output gap Log di¤erence between actual and
Hodrick-Prescott lter trend of real GDP
Capacity utilization rate Demeaned value of the total capacity uti-
lization rate is applied
Financial and monetary variables:
Short rates Federal funds rate, the 3-month Treasury
bill rate
Long rates The 6-month Treasury bill rate, the 1-, 2-,
3-, 5- and 10-year Treasury constant ma-
turity rates
Spread (several) Various spreads between long and short
rates listed above
M2 growth Annual log change of weekly M2 measure
Table cont. next page
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Table 3 (cont.)
Notes: CPIand unemploymentseries are taken from http://data.bls.gov/, real GDP
series is from http://www.bea.gov/National/Index.htm, expected inationis from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MICH/downloaddata, and the remaining vari-
ables are from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/.
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Table 4. In-sample estimation results for models using the best single predictor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable 1t 2t 1t 2t 1t 2t 1t 2t
Spreadt;w 1  4:0 5:1  3:5 4:3  2:0 3:5  2:5 2:8
(1:2) (1:2) (1:8) (1:7) (1:2) (2:1) (1:8) (1:4)
v1;t 1   1:4    :9 
(:5) (:5)
v2;t 1    2:6    2:2
(:8) (:7)
1;t 1     :6  :4 
(:2) (:4)
2;t 1      :4  :3
(:5) (:2)
Constant  2:5  1:2  2:8  2:2  1:4  3:0  1:8  1:6
(:6) (:4) (:7) (:5) (:5) (:8) (1:4) (:5)
Log-likelihood  93:00  79:72  89:86  74:30
Pseudo R2 :48 :62 :52 :63
BIC 1:50 1:38 1:53 1:42
Notes: The models are estimated using 137 observations that cover the period from De-
cember 1989 to January 2007. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are
computed with the procedures of Section 3.3 using the Parzen kernel function. Spread
is the di¤erence between the six-month Treasury bond rate and the federal funds rate.
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Table 5. Estimation results for three best performing models
(1) (2) (3)
Variable 1t 2t 1t 2t 1t 2t
Spreadt;w 1  6:6 9:5  7:1 9:5  8:6 9:5
(1:8) (2:6) (2:1) (2:6) (3:0) (2:6)
Unempt;w 1 :5  2:7 1:2  2:7 1:3  2:7
(:5) (:9) (:4) (:9) (:5) (:9)
Growtht;w 1  :8 :0    
(:3) (:4)
Capacityt;w 1      :3  :0
(:1) (:2)
Constant  4:6 13:0  10:2 13:0  11:5 13:0
(3:2) (5:0) (2:6) (4:5) (3:8) (4:6)
Log-lik.  58:8  64:1  59:2
Pseudo R2 :78 :74 :77
BIC 1:187 1:193 1:194
Notes: The models are estimated using 137 observations that cover the period from De-
cember 1989 to January 2007. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are
computed with the procedures of Section 3 using the Parzen kernel function.
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Table 6. In-sample estimation results for selected models
(1) (2) (3)
Variable 1t 2t 1t 2t 1t 1t
Targett;w 1 :14  :25 1:2  1:2  
(:12) (:14) (:5) (:4)
TCY2t;w 1    1:2 1:1 :01  :1
(:6) (:4) (:14) (:14)
v1;t 1 1:9  1:9  2:0 
(:6) (:6) (:6)
v2;t 1  3:2  3:2  3:1
(:8) (:9) (:7)
Log-likelihood  98:44  91:3  100:4
Pseudo R2 :43 :50 :40
BIC 1:65 1:62 1:68
Notes: The models are estimated using 137 observations that cover the period from De-
cember 1989 to January 2007. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are
computed with the procedures of Section 3.3 using the Parzen kernel function. Target
and TCY2, respectively, refer to the target rate and the two-year Treasury constant
maturity rate.
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Table 7. Out-of-sample accuracy of forecasts based on models with horizon-tailored re-
gressors
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spreadt h+1;w 4        
Unempt h+1;w 4    
Growtht h+1;w 4    
vj;t 1    
(a) pseudo R2
h = 1 :58 :89 :73 :90 :86 :92 :88 :92
h = 2 :54 :78 :66 :74 :63 :77 :69 :74
h = 3 :46 :63 :57 :47 :51 :61 :59 :44
h = 4 :42 :52 :51 :36 :47 :53 :55 :38
h = 6 :27 :26 :36 :23 :22 :18 :33 :21
h = 8     :16   :06   :04  
(b) mean(bpjt)
h = 1 :55 :72 :63 :72 :69 :76 :70 :75
h = 2 :52 :62 :57 :60 :53 :62 :58 :60
h = 3 :49 :53 :51 :48 :50 :53 :52 :48
h = 4 :48 :50 :49 :45 :49 :50 :50 :45
h = 6 :44 :44 :46 :42 :43 :42 :46 :42
h = 8 :42 :39 :45 :40 :40 :40 :45 :37
(c) %(byt = yt)
h = 1 :61 :90 :70 :85 :90 :90 :83 :90
h = 2 :54 :83 :61 :76 :63 :85 :61 :76
h = 3 :54 :68 :51 :53 :54 :70 :49 :59
h = 4 :54 :56 :54 :44 :54 :58 :54 :41
h = 6 :54 :54 :54 :39 :54 :54 :54 :39
h = 8 :54 :54 :54 :46 :54 :54 :54 :46
Table cont. next page
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Table 7 (cont.)
Notes: The out-of-sample forecasts, for all of the applied forecast horizons (h), are for
the FOMC meetings (in total 41) that occurred January 2002 through January 2007.
When h = 1, the estimation sample applied for obtaining a given out-of-sample forecast
constitutes observations on the period from December 1989 until four weeks before the
meeting for which the forecast is made. When h = 2, the estimation sample covers
observations until four weeks in advance to the meeting preceding the meeting for which
the forecast is made and so on. The forecasts are computed using the formula in (12); the
applied model specication is indicated at the top of the table. Panel (a) reports results
on the pseudo R2 measure of out-of-sample t, panel (b) reports the mean of the predicted
probabilities of the realized target changes yt, and panel (c) reports the percentage shares
of the forecasts byt = argmax(bpjt) that match with the realized outcomes yt. In panel (a),
 indicates negative value (or poor out-of-sample t, see footnote 8).
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Table 8. Out-of-sample accuracy of forecasts based on one-period ahead models using the
most recent regressor values
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spreadt;w 4        
Unempt;w 4    
Growtht;w 4    
vj;t 1    
(a) pseudo R2
h = 1 :58 :89 :73 :90 :86 :92 :88 :92
h = 2 :59 :87 :71 :87 :77 :88 :77 :87
h = 3 :59 :83 :71 :83 :71 :84 :73 :83
h = 4 :57 :73 :64 :72 :66 :73 :65 :71
h = 6 :55 :56 :59 :59 :61 :54 :59 :56
h = 8 :47 :21 :36 :22 :51 :15 :37 :17
(b) mean(bpjt)
h = 1 :55 :72 :63 :72 :69 :76 :70 :75
h = 2 :55 :71 :61 :70 :62 :73 :64 :71
h = 3 :54 :69 :60 :67 :59 :70 :61 :68
h = 4 :54 :65 :58 :62 :58 :67 :58 :63
h = 6 :52 :61 :56 :58 :55 :62 :56 :58
h = 8 :49 :54 :52 :53 :50 :55 :53 :53
(c) %(byt = yt)
h = 1 :61 :90 :70 :85 :90 :90 :83 :90
h = 2 :61 :90 :68 :83 :83 :88 :73 :85
h = 3 :61 :85 :66 :80 :76 :85 :68 :80
h = 4 :61 :80 :63 :76 :73 :83 :66 :76
h = 6 :61 :71 :59 :66 :68 :73 :61 :66
h = 8 :58 :61 :59 :59 :61 :61 :61 :56
Table cont. next page
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Table 8 (cont.)
Notes: The notes of Table 7 apply with the following additional remark. The forecasting
formula in (12) now involves out-of-sample values of the regressors, which are replaced by
the end-of-sample observations of the relevant regressors.
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Table 9. Out-of-sample accuracy of forecasts based on one-period ahead models using the
most recent spread value and autoregressive projections of other regressors
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spreadt;w 4      
Unempt;w 4    
Growtht;w 4    
vj;t 1   
(a) pseudo R2
h = 1 :89 :73 :90 :92 :88 :92
h = 2 :87 :69 :87 :88 :77 :87
h = 3 :83 :65 :81 :84 :68 :81
h = 4 :73 :63 :74 :73 :64 :73
h = 6 :56 :54 :59 :55 :56 :57
h = 8 :22 :34 :25 :17 :35 :21
(b) mean(bpjt)
h = 1 :72 :63 :72 :76 :70 :75
h = 2 :70 :61 :70 :72 :64 :71
h = 3 :69 :59 :67 :70 :61 :68
h = 4 :65 :58 :64 :66 :59 :65
h = 6 :60 :56 :60 :62 :56 :60
h = 8 :54 :52 :54 :55 :53 :54
(c) %(byt = yt)
h = 1 :90 :70 :85 :90 :83 :90
h = 2 :88 :63 :83 :88 :71 :83
h = 3 :88 :61 :80 :85 :61 :80
h = 4 :83 :63 :80 :83 :63 :78
h = 6 :73 :66 :71 :73 :66 :71
h = 8 :61 :59 :61 :61 :59 :59
Table cont. next page
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Table 9 (cont.)
Notes: The notes of Table 8 apply with the following additional remark. The out-of-sample
values of the unemployment rate (Unemp) and the real GDP growth rate (Growth)
(that appear in the formula (12)) are replaced by their forecasts based on univariate AR
models.
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